Thus we in Europe are currently facing the enormously difficult task of
organizing two major projects in parallel:
Enlargement as quickly as possible. This poses difficult problems of
adaptation both for the acceding states and for the EU itself. It also
triggers fear and anxiety in our citizens: are their jobs at risk? Will
enlargement make Europe even less transparent and comprehensible for its
citizens? As seriously as we must tackle these questions, we must never
lose sight of the historic dimension of eastern enlargement. For this is a
unique opportunity to unite our continent, wracked by war for centuries,
in peace, security, democracy and prosperity.
Enlargement is a supreme national interest, especially for Germany. It
will be possible to lastingly overcome the risks and temptations
objectively inherent in Germany's dimensions and central situation through
the enlargement and simultaneous deepening of the EU. Moreover,
enlargement - consider the EU's enlargement to the south - is a
pan-European programme for growth. Enlargement will bring tremendous
benefits for German companies and for employment. Germany must therefore
continue its advocacy of rapid eastern enlargement. At the same time,
enlargement must be effected carefully and in accordance with the Helsinki
decision.
Europe's capacity to act. The institutions of the EU were created for
six member states. They just about still function with fifteen. While the
first step towards reform, to be taken at the upcoming intergovernmental
conference and introducing increased majority voting, is important, it
will not in the long term be sufficient for integration as a whole. The
danger will then be that enlargement to include 27 or 30 members will
hopelessly overload the EU's ability to absorb, with its old institutions
and mechanisms, even with increased use of majority decisions, and that it
could lead to severe crises. But this danger, it goes without saying, is
no reason not to push on with enlargement as quickly as possible; rather
it shows the need for decisive, appropriate institutional reform so that
the Unions capacity to act is maintained even after enlargement. The
consequence of the irrefutable enlargement of the EU is therefore erosion
or integration.