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Translated by Frederick Crombie.
This Part: 128 Pages
Page 40
19. After this there followed this point, that "to will and to do are of God." [2369] Our opponents maintain that if to will be of God, and if to do be of Him, or if, whether we act or desire well or ill, it be of God, then in that case we are not possessed of free-will. Now to this we have to answer, that the words of the apostle do not say that to will evil is of God, or that to will good is of Him; nor that to do good or evil is of God; but his statement is a general one, that to will and to do are of God. For as we have from God this very quality, that we are men, [2370] that we breathe, that we move; so also we have from God (the faculty) by which we will, as if we were to say that our power of motion is from God, [2371] or that the performing of these duties by the individual members, and their movements, are from God. From which, certainly, I do not understand this, that because the hand moves, e.g., to punish unjustly, or to commit an act of theft, the act is of God, but only that the power of motion [2372] is from God; while it is our duty to turn those movements, the power of executing which we have from God, either to purposes of good or evil. And so what the apostle says is, that we receive indeed the power of volition, but that we misuse the will either to good or evil desires. In a similar way, also, we must judge of results.
[2369] Cf. Phil. ii. 13.
[2370] Hoc ipsum, quod homines sumus.
[2371] Sicut dicamus, quod movemur, ex Deo est.
[2372] Hoc ipsum, quod movetur.
Reference address : https://www.ellopos.net/elpenor/greek-texts/fathers/origen/principiis.asp?pg=40