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Walter Emil Kaegi, Jr.
Some Thoughts on Byzantine Military Strategy
© Hellenic College Press, Brookline, Massachusetts, 1983
Page 11
The Justinianic reconquest of Italy is an example of a protracted war that became impossible to halt until the destruction, of Byzantium's opponent. The expenses on the Byzantine and Ostrogothic sides were very large. The various diplomatic missions in search of a negotiated settlement all failed, because of Justinian's conviction of the rectitude and probability of success of his policies, in addition to his rather good intelligence on affairs in other areas of the known world. Superior political and military information gave the Byzantines a decisive advantage over the Germanic kingdoms of the Vandals and Ostrogoths. Attempts to end the military deadlock between the Byzantines and Ostrogoths also failed because each party had its own advantage in mind. As long as Justinian could believe that his soldiers were ultimately the victors, there was no possibility of a negotiated settlement.
The Byzantine victory over the Ostrogoths depended, in the long run, heavily on the Byzantine exploitation of the unknown. The Byzantines created too many uncertainties for the Ostrogoths to penetrate in the initial clashes. The Byzantines succeeded in exploiting some importantly perceived asymmetries in weaponry and fighting techniques between themselves and the Ostrogoths in Italy. Procopios explained that Belisarios succeeded in exploiting the absence of mobile horse archers among the Ostrogoths:
Cf. Luttwak on The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire ||| Byzantium : The Alternative History of Europe ||| The pulse of Ancient Rome was driven by a Greek heart ||| A History of the Byzantine Empire ||| Videos about Byzantium and Orthodoxy ||| 3 Posts on the Fall of Byzantium ||| Greek Literature
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Reference address : https://www.ellopos.net/elpenor/byzantine-military.asp?pg=11
